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good by the impulse which seeks them, and what is that impulse, if not the impulse to live? This is what determines the criteria of the ideal, of happiness—rightly to understand which is the essence of the spiritual insight. Its complement is the policy of life, in which the methods and operation that give the ideal a location and an existence are made explicit. They are the ideal's instruments; the ideal is their outcome. Art, considered as civilization or as fine art merely, involves both,—the vision of an ideal of happiness, the exercise of a practice which shall attain it. Its goodness will vary with the degree in which it serves and extends all life's potencies, with the harmonious actualities it prepares, and renders enduring, stable, happy. This life in all its breadth and depth, as it expresses itself in social organization, religion and science as well as in art, we invoke, of necessity as art's measure. Art must be evaluated with reference to the consistent perpetuation of all these activities or of as many as the maintenance of the greatest possible whole of life allows.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

MARTINEAU ON THE OBJECT AND MODE OF MORAL JUDGMENT.

N. C. MUKERJI.

PRESENT-DAY thought, under the lead of idealism, has traveled away considerably from Martineau's ethical position. His position requires modifications in detail perhaps, but in the main still remains, in the writer's conviction, the most faithful interpretation that we have of our moral consciousness. In this paper an attempt will be made to state Martineau's position on "the object and mode of moral judgment"; to clear it from misunderstandings; to point out its differences from the

idealistic position; and incidentally to discuss the relative merits of the contending theories.

There is general agreement among ethical writers that our voluntary actions have an end, and it is the end that gives value or meaning to them. Common speech bears this out when it speaks of a person doing a thing to satisfy his revenge, or his intellectual curiosity, or his pleasure, or something else. Our actions are meaningless without one of these objects. It should be noted here that oftentimes we have a series of actions to satisfy one of these objects, and the whole train of actions gets its value from the end; as when a person obtains leave from his employer and takes a railway journey to see a sick relative.

What is the character of these ends, and what is their number? In common speech 'ends' and 'desires' are used interchangeably. We say, *e. g.*, that the end of a series of acts was intellectual curiosity, or the acts were undertaken with a view to satisfy the *desire* of intellectual curiosity. For the sake of simplicity we shall confine the term 'desires' to 'ends,' though strictly speaking we can not even have intermeditæ acts without a desire for them.¹ There is a controversy here as to whether these 'desires' (which Martineau calls 'the inner springs of conduct') are mere feelings or have an object in view. When I am influenced by love, am I influenced by a mere feeling only, or am I conscious of a loved object? Clearly the desires (ends) are both reason and feeling. For, as psychology tells us, knowing, feeling, and willing are inseparable aspects of consciousness. And it is but a verbal difference whether we express a desire in terms of thought or feeling,—say, *e. g.*, that I am influenced by the feeling of love, or am moved by the consciousness of a loved object. Martineau's criticism of the verbal confusion here is very effective. "Sketch for us," he

¹ This restriction of connotation has the sanction of ethical writers. It is to be found in the writings of Dr. D'Arcy and Dr. Mellone, to mention only two names.

says, "a 'constitution of man's nature' without naming the 'objects of his desires'; or make a list of the 'objects of his desires,' observing silence as to the 'constitution of his nature'; and we will then admit your distinction. Meanwhile, we discern in it only this: You examine human feelings as craving the objects; they examine the objects as craved by the feelings. What would be thought of two rival schools of magnetic science, of which one, in its anxiety to disclaim all connection with 'the house over the way' should announce, 'They measure the force with which the loadstone attracts iron; we measure the force with which the iron tends to the loadstone'?"²

The concrete acts in which the ends find expression are infinite. But the ends, the springs of conduct, are determinate, and psychology gives us a list of these. These ends or desires conflict, and it is the work of our consciousness to organize these conflicting ends, according to their value, into a unity. In this, we find Professor Dewey agreeing, in the main, with Martineau when he says: "Conduct as moral may thus be defined as activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon."³

² Martineau, "Essays," Vol. III, pp. 364f.

³ Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 209. A classification of ends (or desires) has been condemned as abstract. Professor Mackenzie *e. g.*, says, in his "Manual" (p. 133): "What induces us to act is the presentation of some end to be attained. Consequently, if we are to have a list of motives, this list should take the form rather of a classification of ends to be attained, than of feelings that exist in our minds. *Further, these ends would have to be arranged, not under any such abstract headings as 'ambition,' and the like, but in accordance with their actual, concrete nature.*" (The italics are ours.) The condemnation of a classification of ends, like Martineau's, as abstract, is to commit oneself to the position that no two duties are the same in essentials. The implications of this latter position might be briefly touched on. No two duties being the same in essentials, the formation of habits and the moral judgment of others are both equally out of the question,—these depending on the contrary position: a similarity in essentials in our duties. The good, therefore, is individual to the exclu-

So far there has been a fair agreement among the rival schools. Ethics deals with the self-conscious, deals with ends or desires. But the difference in the rival schools emerges here: 1. Are desires (or ends) good in themselves or good because of the end (a *summum bonum*)? 2. Do we know the character of our desires (or ends) by intuition or experience?

Martineau holds that in choosing between contending desires, we know,—previous to any experience of results,—their character. In other words, we intuitively discern the worth of two conflicting springs of conduct. For example, when ‘love’ and ‘hate’ contend, we know, independently of the experience of results, that love is superior to ‘hate.’⁴ This does not mean that Martineau denies ends to our actions. The actions are concerned with the satisfaction of the two ends stated. What Martineau stands for is that the ends are good in themselves and not good because of *the* end (the *summum bonum*). Does this not commit us to mental anarchy; a number of ends pulling each its own way? We shall see later how Martineau meets this difficulty.

But let us address ourselves now to our first question! Are ends good in themselves? or, Have desires an ethical value? The idealist doctrine knows only one good end, not a number of good ends; the proximate ends being but means, and good or bad because of the ultimate end. On this the following observations might be made: (1) It commits us to the position that neutral means make a good end. On its own ground, it could be met by the

sion of its being common. Dr. Rashdall lays down the truer position on this point, when he says: “The very heart of our moral conviction is that there is something which every rational being, in so far as he is rational, must recognize as intrinsically right, *that that something must be the same for all persons under the same conditions, and cannot be dependent upon the subjective caprice of particular persons.*” (“The Theory of Good and Evil,” Vol. p. 151. The italics are ours.)

⁴In making this statement I have not lost sight of exceptions to a graduated scale of springs of conduct. For a discussion of the bearing of exceptions on the validity of the scale, see p. 67.

criticism that it separates the means from the end and so commits an abstraction. If the means and the end are organically related, as idealists very rightly point out,⁵ how can we have a good end without good means? how can the whole be good without the parts being good.⁶

(2) It leads to a *reductio ad absurdum* inasmuch as we can never reach the end without considering the proximate end as *good in itself*. Idealistic writers themselves admit this,—whether consistently or not, is another matter. Dr. D'Arcy says, *e. g.*: “But this subordination to the ethical principle (*i. e.*, the summum bonum) does not mean that the end (*i. e.*, the act) which corresponds to each desire, or interest, is to be sought as a means to a further end. The proximate end is, in every case, the good in itself, and should be sought for its own sake, as the good of the case. . . . It is not necessary for the moral man to look further. Indeed, it is a sign of moral health, and the best way to do well whatever has to be done, not to look further, but, for the time being, to seek the immediate end as if it were ultimate.”⁷ We have, also, Professor Dewey saying the same thing: “But the very nature of right action forbids

⁵“The mind must not only have an end before it, . . . but must have a conception of the *means* to the end. These means, however, are not intrinsically distinct from the end. They are only the proximate ends; *they are the end analyzed into its constituent factors.*” (The italics are ours. Dewey’s “Psychology,” pp. 369-70.)

⁶This point is made by Dr. Rashdall in the following quotation: “We could have no ideal of what is good for society as a whole unless we had a power of pronouncing that this or that particular moment of conscious life is good or bad. Our conception of the moral ideal as a whole is built up of particular judgments of value, though particular judgments of value have to be progressively corrected by our growing conception of the moral ideal as a whole.” (“The Theory of Good and Evil,” Vol. I, p. 96.) For a discussion of the latter part of this quotation where Dr. Rashdall differs from Martineau, see below (p. 68).

Paradoxical as it may seem, idealism holds the contradictory doctrines: (1) that means and ends are organically related, and (2) that evil means may make a good end,—evil being good in the making, at one and the same time.

⁷“A Short Study of Ethics.”

that the self should be the end in the sense of being the conscious aim of moral activity. For there is no way of discovering the nature of the self except in terms of objective ends which fulfil its capacities, and there is no way of realizing the self except as it is forgotten in devotion to these objective ends.”⁸

(3) Rigorously carried out, it will commit us to an absurd form of the doctrine of self-denial. It will mean that we could not take delight in our natural affections, as nothing is good but the end. Nay more, we should have to dislike these affections if we wished to realize the end; otherwise we should be guilty of considering a proximate end as good in itself. In a passage of trenchant criticism Dr. Martineau has shown up the fallacies of this position. After pointing out that this theory requires us to make a desert of our hearts that the end might reign alone, he says: “These moralists may well appear to common men to have neither body nor soul, when they can propound rules so wide of nature. Were they ever hungry? and did they make a point of seeking the things upon the table only as means to moral ends?—and provided the end (say, of recruiting their strength) was accomplished, did they survey the dishes with ghostly impartiality, or reproach themselves with a sinful preference of roast mutton over gruel? Did they ever take a fancy to a fine picture? and did they succeed in desiring it exclusively with a view to encourage art, or educate the taste of the visitors to their drawing-room? Did they ever long for a bunch of grapes for a sick child? or a carriage for an invalid wife, and feel remorse because the wish had no ‘moral end,’ and came only of pure affection?”⁹

(4) Finally, it falsifies the doctrine of self-realization with which it is made to go by idealists. If the capacities which constitute the self demand fulfilment, and if morals is a matter of direction, and not of suppression,—as

⁸ Dewey and Tufts, “Ethics,” pp. 391-2. ⁹ “Essays,” Vol. III, p. 358.

idealists themselves tell us,—then it logically follows that our desires are good in themselves. The logical conclusion of the doctrine that desires are not good in themselves would be pessimistic self-abnegation, and not self-realization.¹⁰

Martineau's conclusion on this point is that ends are good in themselves, but at the same time there is a gradation among them. To quote Martineau: "Morality fulfils its office, not when it has suppressed the natural ends, but when it has prevented any one from being disappointed of his natural ends, and awakened every one to seek them with earnestness *proportioned* to their worth."¹¹

Another way in which Martineau's position is controverted is by saying that a desire (or spring of conduct) is not good in itself but because of its consequences, and this brings us to our second question: Do we know the character of our desires (or ends) by intuition or experience?

As we have seen, all voluntary action is purposive and has an end. Martineau fully recognizes this, as has been already pointed out. But the word 'end' is capable of a double meaning. It could mean either (1) purpose or object in view or (2) consequences,—the after-effects or results of an action. Taking advantage of this ambiguity the idealist tries to make out that purposive action is action which has knowledge of its consequences. But this does not necessarily follow. Purposive action doubtless has a knowledge of its character. But this knowledge may be through intuition and not through observation of consequences. It is here that Martineau joins issue with

¹⁰ It will be noted that the idealist's denial of reality to *a number of good ends* in the interests of the summum bonum is but the ethical counterpart of his denial of reality to human personalities in the interests of the Absolute, in metaphysics.

¹¹ "Essays," Vol. III, pp. 358-9. For the sake of simplicity, I have made no mention of evil desires. A desire good in itself becomes evil, out of its proper place.

the idealist. He argues that we know the character of our actions through intuition and not experience (observation of consequences). The idealist, as Professor Dewey acknowledges, is an empiricist in morals.¹² We are here face to face with the old controversy of motive (or springs of conduct) versus consequence, and shall take it up.

When we speak of judging a spring of conduct by its consequences, we have included in the consequences the willing of the spring of action. When I am moved by 'love,' the realization of the object of love is included in the consequences. This part of the consequences has been called "the ultimate consequent as apprehended and desired," by Professor Muirhead. And Professor Muirhead has shown that it is only this part of the consequences that gives moral character to action. If we deny this, then we shall be landed in the absurdity of calling 'good' the action which has only the appearances of it.¹³

Thus we see, first, that the only sense in which the consequences can be spoken of as truly justifying an action, does not invalidate the judging of an act by the spring. It is only another way of putting the same thing.

But, it should be noted that consequences are not generally understood in this sense, when they are spoken of as justifying conduct. The common appeal to consequences is illustrated by the fear of Heaven's displeasure, *e. g.*, the appeal to keep in the straight path. But this appeal to consequences does not do without a recognition of intuitive principles. We must know God's wrath as *right in itself first*, before we can morally appeal to it as an incentive to keep in the straight path. This

¹² "The empirical theory of conscience is that the individual has no immediate knowledge of right and wrong, either as to particular acts or general principles, but that such knowledge is the outgrowth of continued experience. Logically this is all the empirical theory is required to mean; and in this strict sense, empiricism seems to be true." (Dewey, "The Study of Ethics," p. 92.)

¹³ "The Elements of Ethics," (3d ed.), pp. 62ff, 107.

knowledge of God's wrath, and pleasure as well, goes with our knowledge of every spring. Again, the appeal to the sorrow caused by bad living to our near and dear ones, is but an appeal to attendant other springs of conduct leading to the same effect. This does not mean that the consequences make a thing right, for we justifiably disregard the sorrow in some cases.

The consequences, as we have seen, have to be known as *right in themselves first*, and this means an appeal to the springs. Consequences do not come to us labelled as good and bad, and we have to decipher them. One has to be a kind man first, to make out a kind consequence; an ambitious man, to make out an ambitious consequence, etc. In other words, we must know the character of the corresponding spring of action before we can judge a consequence. So we conclude, secondly, that the appeal to consequences, as generally understood, is but an appeal to a number of attendant springs which make for the same effect.

The strength of the appeal to consequences has lain in the vagueness of it, and in the use of abstractions like 'the greater good,' 'self-culture,' etc. But the moment we realize that such abstractions provide no helpful criterion of judgment, and that ultimately we are thrown back upon the circle of our springs of action,—each spring being distinct from another and not the explanation of it,—that moment the strength of the appeal is gone. The appeal to consequences, as generally understood, commits itself to a psychological confusion as to our springs of conduct, merging them in one another and failing to perceive their distinctness.

Some of the implications of judging acts by consequences as opposed to springs, intuitively discerned, might here be pointed out. (1) It commits us, in the hands of its consistent exponents, to an evolution of morality from un-morality, of reason from un-reason. It commits us to frank empiricism in morals. This we have already touched on, and shall now treat of more

fully. Professor Dewey, for instance, would have us accept the view that man begins as a creature of impulses, ignorant of their character and rank. Then by an observation of the consequences of these impulses (which are non-rational and blind, be it noted) his moral consciousness is evolved. The following illustration from Professor Dewey will explain his position. "The first meaning of an impulse of anger," he says, "is simply *blind reaction*, but this reaction has consequences (relations to others, habits established, etc.), which are, from that time on, part of the impulse. This tendency to act without thought, to set up hostile relations to others, is now the meaning which the impulse has for the self. Or the *blind reaction* of anger is against some meanness; it serves to do away with that meanness and to brace the self."¹⁴ The transition from the non-moral to the moral is further illustrated in the following quotation from the same author: "It is only through taking into account in subsequent acts consequences of prior acts not intended in those prior acts that the agent learns the fuller significance of his own power and thus of himself. . . . In subsequent experience these results, mere by-products of the original volition, enter in. *Outer* and non-moral for the original act, they are *within* subsequent voluntary activity, because they influence desire and make foresight more accurate in detail and more extensive in range."¹⁵ The only criticism we need make on this position is to say with Martineau that from the un-moral to the moral there is no road. In the second stage here, Professor Dewey has surreptitiously taken for granted the very thing he has to prove,—how a creature of blind impulses can ever judge moral consequences; a prior intuitive knowledge being necessary, as we have seen, for judging moral consequences.

We have our contention further borne out by Professor

¹⁴ Dewey, "The Study of Ethics," p. 22. The italics are ours.

¹⁵ Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 261.

Paulsen. He carries this position to its logical conclusion and justly remarks that,—a point which less consistent thinkers on his side fail to see,—“if before reaching a decision, we should have to figure out all the possible favorable and unfavorable effects of a deed, we should never act.” Some contrivance has to be found which would save us from this *impasse*. Accordingly we find Professor Paulsen explaining: “Hence the process is abbreviated; acts are as a rule *automatic reactions*, which are released, without much calculation, by circumstances, by the occasion.”¹⁶ This explanation is frank and logical, though self-destructive, for it is nothing short of a metaphysical legerdemain to evolve morality out of un-morality, as it is to evolve mind out of mere sensations.

(2) If the subsequent internal consequences of an act alone reveal its character, then we cannot know wrong before committing it. It thus commits us to the position “Be ye vicious in order to be virtuous,” and confuses virtue and vice. Professor Dewey admits this conclusion frankly. Says he: “Only because the bad act brings to light a new good is its own badness manifested. The reaction of the deed upon character, in other words, brings that character to consciousness; it shows character its own powers and requirements, and thus enables it to pass judgment upon, *i. e.*, to appreciate its own unworthiness. . . . Only the man becoming good recognizes evil as evil.”¹⁷

(3) If we do not know the character of an act before doing it, then human responsibility is struck at the very root. For, to be responsible, we must be conscious

¹⁶ ‘Introduction to Philosophy,’ Engl. Transl., p. 428.

¹⁷ But does not Professor Dewey, in speaking of the character coming into consciousness, by the reacting of the deed on it, take for granted the power of moral discernment previously latent in it? Is this not giving up empiricism for intuitionism? But even so, the position is an evolution of morality from unmorality, a transition from unconscious to conscious character; and so as fatuous an attempt as to evolve consciousness out of sensations.

of the character of the alternative acts before us, previous to the choosing of one of them.

In the foregoing pages we have examined the arguments advanced against Martineau's intuitionism. In the concluding section we shall examine the arguments advanced against Martineau's theory of the existence of a scale of higher and lower in our springs of action. Martineau's scale has been criticised with great acuteness and fairness by Sidgwick. His criticisms still hold the field and need an answer. Very rightly Sidgwick concentrates his criticism on the ethical essentials of the scale,—the question of a higher and lower among our springs of conduct,—rather than on the psychological details of its working out.

Before taking up Sidgwick's criticism, it will be worth our while to note his theory of the moral judgment on which his criticism of Martineau is based. Sidgwick's theory in substance is that in a conflict, we judge the *effects* of two lines of possible action, with reference to the ultimate end. "The comparison ultimately decisive," says Sidgwick, when a serious question of conduct is raised, "would inevitably be not a comparison between the motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which they respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end of reasonable action."¹⁸

Two points stand out in connection with Sidgwick's theory of moral judgment. The first is: What is it we judge,—motive or consequent? The second is: What is the relation of the effects to the end, or, of means to the end? The first point we have already discussed sufficiently in the previous sections. As to the second point, all that we need say is that it makes the end an entity over and above the means (so denying that virtue is in the end and making the latter formal), failing to grant

¹⁸ "Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau," p. 361.

that the springs of action are good in themselves and not because of consequences.

Now as to Sidgwick's criticism of the scale. (1) He points out that in a conflict between the lower motives (*e. g.*, love of ease and love of gain) the conflict is never decided by a duel between them singly, but higher considerations intervene (like regard for health and ultimate efficiency) on the winning side (*i. e.*, love of ease) and thus give the victory. I do not see how these higher considerations invalidate the conflict between the two lower springs. They are but the attendant springs, as we have seen, which make for the same effect, and to fail to distinguish between them and the original spring (*i. e.*, the lower springs in this case) is but to be guilty of a psychological confusion. If pressed hard, Sidgwick's contention further suggests that the lower motives are not good in themselves and have no place in the economy of our moral lives,—a position which Sidgwick himself combats in the criticism following.

(2) Sidgwick again points out (a) that the relationship between a pair of springs of conduct, in point of rank, is not universal as pointed out by Martineau; that this relationship has exceptions,—a lower spring being sometimes preferred to a higher, as 'love of ease' to 'culture'; and (b) that Martineau's scale does not allow its proper sphere to a natural impulse; it having always to give way to those higher on the scale.

The two criticisms are related, and had better be considered together. Whenever a natural impulse is allowed its sphere (as when we prefer 'love of ease' to 'culture'), the relationship of their rank is interfered with, and the scale stands condemned; and whenever the higher is preferred when it is justifiable to choose the lower ('love of ease' instead of 'culture' when our constitution requires it), the lower is not allowed its proper sphere, and so, again, the scale stands condemned. It should be noted, in passing, that these criticisms have a just application with reference to a hard and fast, and

rigid scale, and that they are both based on a common objection,—the failure to allow exceptions in such a scale.

In arguing, therefore, that there are exceptions to the scale, Sidgwick is borne out by our consciousness. It might be thought that the admission of exceptions invalidates the intuitive perception of gradation. It is not so, however, if the intuition includes the exceptions. And this is our contention. We know intuitively where the rank holds and where exceptions come in. Thus we can allow a natural impulse its proper place in an intuitively graded scale, without hurt to the gradation itself.

It will be urged that it is a consideration of consequences, of circumstances, and not intuition, that determines the exception. We may ask, however, whether consequences and circumstances are not taken into consideration in the non-exceptional cases; whether judgment is pronounced in spite of consequences and circumstances in such cases. Consequences, we have sufficiently seen, have no meaning except in terms of the springs, and the same may be said of circumstances.

We may well pause here to note that exceptions do not invalidate an intuitive scale if they are perceived intuitively, as we contend. We shall have to allow exceptions to the moral rule on any theory. We are familiar with the problem in utilitarianism with its difficulty of harmonizing 'rational self-love' and rational benevolence,' as seen in Sidgwick's position. Idealism with its theory of self-realization does not escape it. For, while we are told to realize all our faculties, one faculty has to be sacrificed to another: 'art,' for example, to 'morality.' Dr. Mellone sees the contradiction, and the right solution has been suggested by him. In substance he states that this contradiction is an element attaching to our present imperfect condition. In the perfect state it will be possible to develop all our faculties without developing one spring at the expense of another.¹⁹

¹⁹ Mellone, "Philosophical Criticism and Construction."

(3) The other example mentioned by Sidgwick, of a higher spring giving way to a lower,—*viz.*, ‘compassion’ to ‘resentment,’—suggests the second qualification in Martineau’s theory: that in the hierarchy of our springs of conduct there are a number of springs of equal rank. His example would properly come under this formula. In a well-blended character none of these elements (*i. e.*, ‘compassion’ and ‘resentment’ or ‘love’ and ‘anger’) should give way to the other. Else it will become ‘sentimental’ or ‘vindictive,’ as the case may be. The other primary passions (in Martineau’s scale),—‘fear’ and ‘antipathy,’—hold the same relationship to ‘compassion.’ In a well-blended character all these elements should be present together. Still, among these equals, ‘compassion’ holds a superior place, being *primus inter pares* so to speak,—a point in which Sidgwick agrees with Martineau and with commonsense.²⁰

(4) One more criticism of the scale deserves notice. Professor Upton points out that in history there has been a change in our estimation of the relative ranks of our impulses, and that Martineau’s scale, while expressing the Christian consciousness very well, would not express the pre-Christian. Professor Upton concludes from this that our individual judgments depend on our moral ideal, and change because the ideal is progressive.²¹ This also is, in substance, Dr. Rashdall’s position noticed before. To this our reply is that judgment by the moral ideal does not render a scale superfluous, it being only another name for it. As Martineau well says:²² “But in detail this good (the supreme good) will require the preference now of one natural end, now of another, according as the comparison which occasions it shifts with varying circumstances up and down the scale of impelling principles.” The fact of moral development,—of change in our moral judgments,

²⁰ “Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau,” p. 358.

²¹ Upton, “Dr. Martineau’s Philosophy,” p. 144.

²² “Essays,” Vol. III, 364ff.

—brings out the point that the scale as it exists to-day (*i. e.*, the present ranking of the springs of conduct) has not existed from the beginning (*e. g.*, in the Old Testament vindictiveness is superior to love). The reason for it is the “moral disorder of our world,” or “the incomplete stage of our present existence,” however you choose to describe it. Moral progress, under the circumstances, consists largely of straightening out the scale, as it were. This does not discredit intuitionism; it only proves that moral progress has been largely a progress from error to truth, rather than from truth to truth.

We have, therefore, been led, under the stress of Sidgwick’s criticism, to qualify Martineau’s theory in two ways: First, that there are exceptions to the general rank of impulses; and that these exceptions are *intuitively* discerned. Secondly, that there is an order of springs of equal rank in the hierarchy. These qualifications have been, we think, suggested by Martineau, though not worked out and do not, in our consideration, affect his central position,—that there is a graduated scale of our springs of conduct intuitively discerned,—a position on which turns the question, as we have tried to show, whether our ethics shall be personal or materialistic.

N. C. MUKERJI.

ARTHUR EWING CHRISTIAN COLLEGE, ALLAHABAD, INDIA.